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Abstract
We propose a computational model of visual search that incorporates Bayesian
interpretations of the neural mechanisms that underlie categorical perception and
saccade planning. To enable meaningful comparisons between simulated and hu-
man behaviours, we employ a gaze-contingent paradigm that required participants
to classify occluded MNIST digits through a window that followed their gaze. The
conditional independencies imposed by a separation of time scales in this task
are embodied by constraints on the hierarchical structure of our model; planning
and decision making are cast as a partially observable Markov Decision Process
while proprioceptive and exteroceptive signals are integrated by a dynamic model
that facilitates approximate inference on visual information and its latent causes.
Our model is able to recapitulate human behavioural metrics such as classification
accuracy while retaining a high degree of interpretability, which we demonstrate
by recovering subject-specific parameters from observed human behaviour.
1 Introduction
The way we see the world is contingent upon the way we move our eyes, behind every eye movement
is an inferential process that determines what to place within the central 2◦ of the visual field that is
processed by 50% of our primary visual cortex [1]. Consciously or not, whatever it is that we see, it
is usually the case that we sought to see it. This presumption is supported by the pre-motor theory of
attention [2] which suggests the neural mechanisms underlying the planning and execution of eye
movements are closely linked with those responsible for attentional modulation. From this we may
presume that by analysing eye movements we may gain insight into the inferential processes guiding
their deployment.
In the setting of behavioural experiments, observed behaviours are often contextualised by objective
task contingencies or rules, yet less frequently considered are the subjective perceptual representations
that enable an individual to recognise these contingencies. In this paper we propose a computational
model of visual search that facilitates inference on an individual’s behaviour and their subjective
perceptual inferences, a problem that has previously been described as one of meta-Bayesian inference
[3], i.e., making inferences about inferences. We evaluate our model with a gaze-contingent (moving-
window) paradigm in which human participants were asked to classify handwritten digits from the
MNIST dataset [4]. In this task the contents of the visual scene were occluded beyond a window that
followed participant’s gaze.
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Figure 1: Gaze-contingent paradigm. Human participants were asked to classify 100 digits as
quickly and as accurately as possible. Answers were reported by pressing a button and focusing their
gaze on the corresponding choice location. Note that the grey areas of the mask are made transparent
for illustrative purposes only.
2 Motivation
Perhaps the most influential model of visual attention is Itti’s implementation [5] of Koch & Ullman’s
computational theory of saliency [6] in the primate visual system. However, this and other models
of attentional selection that omit the influence of an agent’s internal states and intentions will be
challenged by the complexity and scope of many behavioural tasks [7], in part due to an inability to
dynamically reattribute salience with respect to new information. The role of top-down attentional
modulation has featured more prominently in recent models [8][9] of eye movements, and the concept
of ‘salience’ has given some way to that of ‘priority’. The deployment of spatial attention and salience
attribution has been attributed to ‘priority maps’ encoded by interactions between lateral interparietal
area [10] [11], frontal eye fields [12][13] and the superior colliculus [14].
Neural representations of visual salience are not serially processed one fixation at a time [15] but
through a process wherein the lateral interparietal area and frontal eye fields select saccade targets in
advance of saccades and project to intermediate layers of the superior colliculus to influence lower
motor pathways. We reflect this process in the implementation of feature or priority maps in the
state-space of our model; while evaluating potential saccade locations the agent will be influenced
by the conditional feature probabilities encoded by these maps, allowing it to allocate attention over
regions of visual space that are likely to confirm (or refute) hypotheses about the identity of the digit.
In our formulation we assume that the priority maps for each digit class are computed a-priori, yet
their influence is effectively dynamic, as the agent relies upon ascending messages from the dynamic
model to weigh their relative utility. We view this analogously with participants having knowledge
about the general form of each digit and utilising this information to locate visually salient visual
features.
Due to the retinocentric organisation of neurons in the visual cortex, representations of the visual
field may switch or change dramatically between fixations. To account for this, the motor cortex
generates a copy of its output in the form of ‘corollary discharge’ [16]. These signals are sent to visual
areas to inform predictions of reafferent visual feedback, i.e, in distinguishing retinal displacement
from movement in the external environment [17] and of proprioceptive signals from the eye muscles
[18]. In our model these signals, induced during policy selection in the Markov Decision Process
(MDP), impose empirical priors on the output of a dynamic model that generates predictions about
the outcomes of action [19]. Empirical proprioceptive priors here are simply target locations in 2D
visual space while the empirical exteroceptive priors are defined over the latent space of a variational
autoencoder, which acts as a proxy for the forward (generative) models in the sensory cortex that
compute visual predictions.
3 Formulation
All inference schemes based on probability density functions can be reformulated as optimisation
problems under a variational formulation of Bayes rule. In brief, this involves approximating the true
posterior with a variational (proposal) density that can be optimised with respect to observed data
[20]. Optimisation in this context corresponds to minimizing variational free energy, a lower bound
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[21] on the approximate log-evidence of a model. This technique is commonly used in machine
learning for approximating intractable posterior densities with neural networks [22][23][24]. It is
also central to the Free Energy Principle, a mathematical formulation of how adaptive systems resist
a natural tendency to disorder [25][26] and Active inference, a neurobiologically influenced process
theory of how the neuronal mechanisms of action and perception are unified by this objective [19]. In
the following section we show how perception and behaviour (eye movements) can be formulated as
inference on the hidden states of the world, and how these processes can be simulated by optimising
the variational free energy of a generative model of the environment.
We first construct our visual foraging task as a partially observable Markov decision process with
categorical task outcomes. Under this model beliefs are expressed as the joint density of observations,
hidden states, policies and precision:
P (o˜, s˜, pi, γ) = P (pi|γ)P (γ)
T∏
t=1
P (ot|st)P (st|st−1,pi)
Where a likelihood matrix P (ot = i|st = j) = Aij defines the probability of an outcome o under
every combination of hidden states s and the transition matrix P (st = i|st−1 = j, pi) = B (u)ij
defines the probabilistic mapping from the hidden states at the current time step to the hidden states
at the next time step under some action u. Under this model, outcomes o are determined only by the
current state st and beliefs about state transitions are determined by policies, where each policy pi
comprises a series of actions u = pi (t). The mapping between policies and hidden states is influenced
by the agent’s prior preferences, or the epistemic value of each outcome:
P (o) := σ(C)
The precision parameter γ determines an agent’s confidence in its decisions, or expected uncertainty,
defined as an inverse-gamma distribution with precision β:
P (γ) = Γ
(
1, β =
1
γ
)
The state-space of the MDP is comprised of 3 primary hidden state factors, digit , where and report .
The digit factor defines the possible target classes. The where factor defines regions in visual space
to which the agent can saccade. There are 49 such locations arranged in a 7x7 grid and an additional
location that the agent must saccade to before making a decision. The report factor defines control
states that the agent may invoke to either report the target class or remain undecided. In all trials
the undecided state persists through the first transition, giving the agent enough time to forage for
information before having to report its decision. Finally, a variable number of feature factors define
visual features such as contrast or orientation. While the number of factors is determined a-priori by
a saliency-map algorithm, the possible states within each feature factor represent the presence of the
corresponding feature, for example 1 and 5 may represent ‘None’ and ‘Strong’ contrast, respectively.
We found that [5][27] and [28] produced suitable class-contingent saliency maps.
The model considers 3 outcome modalities, digit, where and feedback. The digit and where outcomes
are mapped directly to their corresponding hidden state factors while the third modality provides the
agent with feedback in the form 3 possible outcomes, correct, incorrect or undecided. If the invoked
control state from the report factor is aligned with the target class the model will observe correct
feedback, which is associated with high utility, otherwise it will receive incorrect feedback which
is associated with low utility. Note that the causal structure of the hidden states precludes direct
influence of extrinsic reward on the instantaneous belief updates that occur within the subordinate
(continuous) level.
Having defined a generative model, the agent’s approximate posterior Q can be computed by inverting
the generative model, allowing the agent to form expectations about the hidden states:
Q(s˜, pi) = Q(pi)
T∏
t=1
Q(st|pi)
In our gaze-contingent task, visual observations depend upon sequences of saccades requiring the
generative model to entertain expectations under different policies, or sequences of actions. The
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equation above states that the approximate posterior can be factorised by taking the product of the
marginal state and policy distributions over time, assuming that control states are approximately
independent from one another at each time step. The variational free energy may now be defined
with respect to this factorised distribution:
F = −EQ(s˜,pi) [lnP (o˜, s˜, pi|m)]−H [Q (s˜, pi)]
= EQ(pi)
[−EQ(s˜|pi) [lnP (o˜, s˜|pi)]−H [Q (s˜|pi)]]+KL [Q (pi) |P (pi)]
= EQ(pi) [Fpi] +KL [Q (pi) |P (pi)]
Where Fpi is the energy of a policy over each time-step:
Fpi =
∑
τ
Fpiτ
Fpiτ = −EQ(sτ |pi)Q(sτ−1|pi)[[τ ≤ t] · lnP (oτ |sτ ) + lnP (sτ |sτ−1, pi)− lnQ (sτ |pi)]
Having defined an objective function, beliefs about the hidden states may be iteratively optimised by
gradient descent:
˙ˆs
pi
τ = ∂sˆ s
pi
τ · εpiτ
spiτ = σ (sˆ
pi
τ )
εpiτ = (Aˆ · oτ + Bˆpiτ−1 · spiτ−1 + Bˆpiτ · spiτ+1)− sˆpiτ
= −∂sF
Solutions to the above equations converge toward posterior expectations that minimize free energy,
providing Bayesian estimates of the hidden states that minimize prediction errors εpiτ , expressed here
as free energy gradients. This model encapsulates a single trial of the task lasting approximately 2
seconds, or a maximum of 8 saccades.
The nature of the task requires the agent to utilise visual information that cannot be evaluated
directly within the MDP. This issue is addressed by supplementing the agent’s generative model
with an additional (subordinate) continuous-time model that can accumulate evidence from the
visual domain [29] i.e. directly from the attended pixels. In this model, conditional expectations µ˜
about proprioceptive and exteroceptive sensory information are encoded by the internal states of the
agent’s ‘brain’ in the form of a recognition density q(x, v, a|µ) that approximates the true posterior
p(x, v, a|y,m), where y are the values of the attended pixels and the angular displacement of the eye.
As before, this density can be optimised by maximizing Bayesian model evidence, or minimising
variational energy:
F (y˜, µ˜) = −lnp(y|m) +KL[q(x, v, a|µ)||p(x, v, a|y,m)]
By assuming a Gaussian form for the recognition density p(x, v, a|y,m), we assume a local quadratic
form for the variational free energy [30] under the generative model:
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lnp (y˜, v˜, x˜, a˜|µ˜) = 1
2
ln
∣∣∣Π˜∣∣∣− 1
2
ε˜T Π˜ε˜
Π˜ =
Π˜v Π˜x
Π˜a

ε˜ =

ε˜v =
[
y
v(1)
]
−
[
g
η
]
ε˜x = x˜ − f
ε˜a = a − η

This formulation shows that the probabilistic generative model can be expressed in terms of prediction
errors ε˜ and their precision Π. Estimates of the causal states v, their dynamics x and action a
are derived from response g(t) and state f(t) functions, described below. Empirical priors η are
descending messages that convey the expected outcomes from the what and where modalities of the
superordinate MDP.
Figure 2: Predictive Coding Scheme. By integrating this scheme targets of interest are selected
and brought within the agent’s receptive field, inducing proprioceptive and exteroceptive stimuli
y and prediction errors ε. State-units encoding conditional expectations µ˜ are illustrated in black
while error-units encoding precision-weighted prediction errors ξ are illustrated in red. The blurry
prediction y˜e on the left side of the image is generated from the prior network pθ under the weighted
sum of random (uncertain) hypotheses vh. Exteroceptive prediction errors εe are derived from the
absolute difference between this prediction and the observed stimulus at the sampling location xo.
Proprioceptive prediction errors εp are derived from the difference between the current foveal location
xo and the saccade target vo determined by top-down empirical priors η induced by policy selection
in the MDP. As prediction errors are minimized, uncertainty is reduced and predictions become
more accurate. MATLAB implementations of this optimisation scheme ’spm_MDP_VB_X’ and
’spm_ADEM’ are available to download as part of the SPM toolbox at fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm
The agent interprets sensory information as though it were derived from two distinct modalities or
streams; proprioceptive information yp corresponds to the angular displacement of the eye, or the
centre of gaze in extrinsic (cartesian) coordinates. Exteroceptive information ye corresponds to visual
stimuli sampled from a uniform gridR of 82 pixels centred around yp.
y˜ = g =
[
y˜p
y˜e
]
=
[
yo
R(ye, yo)
]
+ ω
yo = f = vo − xo
ye =
∑
h
pθ (ye|ρ, exp(vh))
5
Where the Gaussian innovations ω induce small high-frequency perturbations (1-2 pixels) to the
foveal sampling location. The causal states v comprise a 2D scalar target location vo and digit class
probabilities vh, both of which are prescribed by the superordinate MDP level. The final equality
shows that competing visual hypotheses are scaled to reflect conditional uncertainty using the entropy
of their (softmax) probabilities. The hidden states x are the resulting motion of the eye relative to this
location and the transitive values of the probability vector describing the subject’s belief about the
target digit.
Posterior beliefs about the underlying causes of visual input qΘ(zc, zd|y) are optimised a-priori
by a neural network with parameters Θ. This network encodes the sufficient statistics of a joint
distribution over discrete zd ≡ vh and continuous zc ≡ ρ factors of variation in the MNIST
dataset. Categorical class probabilities zd are encoded by Gumbel Softmax [31] or concrete [32]
distribution pΘ(zd|y) = Gumbel(zd). Variations in within-class visual features such as orientation
and width are encoded by a multivariate normal distribution qΘ(zci |y) = N(µi, σ2i ) with a unit prior
p(zc) = N (0, 1). The generative (prior) component of this model pθ(y|zc, zd) is a neural network
with parameters θ that maps learned beliefs zc and zd to observations in the visual domain. Under the
assumption that the discrete and continuous variables are conditionally independent, the objective
function for both the posterior Θ and prior θ networks may be composed as per (Dupont, 2018) to
facilitate the regularization of the discrete and continuous KL divergence terms during training:
L(Θ, θ) = EqΘ(zc,zd|y)[logpθ(y|zc, zd)]
−rc|KL[ qΘ(zc, y) || p(zc)]− kc|
−rd|KL[ qΘ(zd, y) || p(zd)]− kd|
Where r and k are free regularisation parameters. Doing so encourages disentanglement [33] of
the latent variables, allowing for each factor of variation in the data to be learned and subsequently
coupled with one or more outcome modalities in the MDP. Here we are concerned only with the
disentanglement of the target classes and their relationship to the digit outcome modality, but this
technique may prove useful for other experimental paradigms. With this model we may describe the
dynamics of the task, including semantic content and ocular-motor dynamics as differential equations
that are integrated with respect to sensory input over the duration of a single saccade ( 200ms), or a
single state transition within the Markov process.
Communication between the Markov process and the dynamic model is mediated by a link function
that transforms ascending prediction error messages ε˜v from the continuous-time model into posterior
expectations o˜ over outcomes in the Markov model and descending predictions from the Markov
model into empirical priors η at the continuous level.
We define a set of reduced (competing) models ϑ by collapsing a prior density over each possible
outcome R ∈ [1, 10x50]. Each reduced model ϑm is a prior encoding a visual hypothesis at a target
saccade location, evaluated over the duration of the saccade:
E (t)m =− lnoτ,m −
∫ T
0
L (t)mdt
L (t)m =lnP (y˜ (t) |ϑm)− lnP (y˜t|η)
oτ =
∑
pipi · oτpi ϑ =
∑
ϑm · oτm
The free energy E at the last time-step of the sequence takes the place of posterior expectations over
outcomes o in the MDP. See [29] for a neurobiological interpretation of this function.
4 Results
We first demonstrate that our model can categorize digits based on limited foveated sampling. In this
example we see that the model builds its beliefs about the identity of the digit in only three saccades
(Figure 3).
To estimate subject-specific parameters from observed behaviour we specify an objective model mo
in terms of the likelihood p(y|θ, λ(ϑ), u,mo) of (the participant’s) behavioural responses y and a
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Figure 3: Model Outcomes. Column 1) Unfoveated task stimulus y, with a red dot marking the
foveation location (which neither the model of human participant could see). Column 2) Task stimulus
foveated around xp (observable by model and human participants). Column 3) The agent’s visual
expectation about the global scene generated from the prior network pθ. Column 4) The agent’s
visual expectation about the stimulus at xp. 5) Posterior expectation about the target location ol. 6)
Ascending posterior expectation about the target digit oh.
prior over the unknown parameters p(ϑ, θ|mo). The implicit generative model λ(ϑ), with subjective
parameters ϑ ∈ x, v, ρ, in the likelihood function provides a differentiable mapping from task stimuli
u to participant’s behaviour y. The unknown parameters of the objective model θ ∈ C, β correspond
to putative neurobiological quantities that we wish to infer; we focus here on the precision of prior
preferences over outcomes C, which we presume to be encoded by the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
[34] and the inverse precision of beliefs about control states β, which we presume to be encoded by
dopaminergic projections from ventral tegmental area and substantia nigra to the striatum [35][36].
We optimise this objective model to recover estimates of C and β with respect to observed behaviour
(Figure 4) using the same variational technique as the subjective model i.e gradient descent on
variational free energy [37].
Figure 4: Model inversion with respect to observed behaviour. A) The trajectory of the estimated
parameters in parameter space. B) The lower bound of the log-model evidence approximated as
variational free energy. C) Final conditional parameter estimates.
By simulating 100 trials for each digit class with the parameters recovered from model inversion, we
find that on average, the correct digit is inferred on 88% of trials after 5.02 saccades (Figure 5). This
corresponds to 35.7% pixels viewed relative to the total number of pixels in the image. The code used
to generate these results is available to download from https://github.com/v2c08/M-BMVS.
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Figure 5: Behavioural metrics as a function of model parameters. Red (horizontal) lines indicate
the mean human responses. Green (vertical) lines indicate the parameter values recovered from
model inversion. The top row displays these metrics as a function of policy precision γ with inverse
temperature β. As β increases, or as the agent’s confidence in its actions decreases, accuracy declines,
fixations become longer and the total number of saccades increase. The top-right figure shows the
average percentage of (unique) attended pixels as a function of the total number of saccades. The
bottom row shows that the accuracy of the model increases as it’s intrinsic motivation to observe
correct feedback (C) increases, and that for C<=3, the model is not incentivised to make a decision.
The bottom-right figure shows the average free energy of the model as a function of the model
parameters.
5 Discussion
An important mechanistic assumption made by the Free Energy Principle and other related Bayesian
Brain theories [38][39] is that the physical states of sensory systems encode probabilistic representa-
tions of the environment that interact over multiple spatial and temporal scales. Empirical support
for these theories comes primarily from studies of predictive coding [40] in the sensory cortices
[41][42][43]. Theories of predictive coding cast the cerebral cortex as a Bayesian generative model
that implements approximate (variational) inference through a recursive interchange of prediction
and error signals. We appeal to this theory in our work and present a hierarchical model of visual
search that incorporates Bayesian interpretations of the physiological processes governing perception
and behaviour.
While the model may seem complex, its form and the attendant variational optimisation scheme
can be generalised to most if not all behavioural paradigms. The discrete Markov scheme has
previously been used to model context learning [44], goal-directed behaviour [45], addiction [46],
scene construction [47], and reading [48] while the dynamic scheme has been used to simulate
perception [49], attention [50] and sensorimotor integration [51].
However, in many cases the coupled differential equations that define the response and dynamic
functions cannot be specified due to the complexity of the task-relevant data, i.e. high-dimensional
inputs with causal or temporal relationships between modalities. In this work we demonstrate the
use of unsupervised generative neural networks in place of the unknown or intractable response
function. Appealing once again to predictive coding, we draw a comparison between learned visual
representations in the brain and the latent variables of the variational autoencoder. We presume
that representations in the brain are derived from prediction errors invoked by sensory interactions
with the environment, and that the compositional structure of these representations reflect the causal
structure of the stimuli from which they are derived. The scheme presented here is particularly well
suited to tasks in which representations of task-relevant stimulus categories can be ‘disentangled’
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by neural networks. Doing so allows the experimenter to account for each factor of variation in the
experimental design, and their latent representations in the subjective ‘forward’ model of the task.
We have identified several ways in which our model may be extended, for example to facilitate
the categorisation of naturalistic images; to do so one may consider replacing our relatively simple
decoder network pθ with a more powerful autoregressive decoder such as [52]. It may also be possible
to integrate other (interpretable) mechanisms for class-contingent salience attribution such-as [53],
allowing the agent to evaluate the likelihood of policies defined over internal representations of space,
rather than a simple 2D grid. One may also wish to improve the proprioceptive component of our
model by incorporating continuous ocular kinetic parameters within the subjective generative model
as per [54]. Doing so would allow the model to more accurately account for individual differences in
occular-motor dynamics.
6 Experimental Procedures
A visual eye-tracking study was performed on healthy participants to analyse scan paths during
visual search. Movements of the left eye were tracked and recorded at 1kHz with an Eyelink1000
(SR Research) system. A 12-point calibration procedure was implemented at the beginning of each
recording session. We used a Windows 7 desktop computer and a monitor displaying at a resolution
of 1280 x 1024 @ 85.3 Hz. This experiment was realised using Cogent Graphics developed by John
Romaya at the LON at the Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, and Psychophysics
Toolbox extensions for MATLAB [55][56]. In total 28 participants were recruited, aged 20-34
(M=26.5, SD=3.5), all participants had a visual acuity of 20/20 read from a Pocket Snellen chart.
Approval was granted by the KCL Research Ethics Subcommittee Ref:MRM-18/19-11544 and all
participants gave written informed consent.
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